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curtailing constitutional rights.5 1 Neither the Passport Act nor
the Immigration and Nationality Act expressly allows any type of
passport restriction. If construed narrowly, such a grant of author-
ity is difficult to derive from these statutes. In justification of
this derivation of power, the Court in Zemel argued that an un-
specified grant of power may be implied in the light of the ex-
ecutive's historical assumption of that power. The Court mentions
several cases which have so construed statutes, but in none was a
restriction of a constitutional right sought.52 The mandate of Kent
and many other Supreme Court decisions-to narrowly construe
statutes restricting constitutional rights-appears to have been
displaced by the Court's argument.
Since the enactment of Section 215 of the Immigation and
Nationality Act, and with the Presidential Proclamation of 1953
which declared the state of a national emergency, it is presently
unlawful for a person to leave the country without a passport.
Coupled with the recognition of the executive's power to impose
area restrictions on passports, the President and his delegated agents
may curtail an affirmed constitutional right without any clearly
defined restraints. Neither Congress nor the Court has given
any indication of the extent to which restrictions may be carried.
Without any statutory or judicial restraints, the power to restrict
passports could become an arbitrary control over travel, which the
State Department might effectuate by increasing the number of
restricted areas. 53 This potentiality may become aggravated by the
Court's apparent willingness to accept without question the State
Department's opinion as to what constitutes a national emergency.
In cases where express congressional approval is lacking, courts
should examine extensively the reasons for restricting the right
to travel, and should not permit the violation of any constitutional
right in the absence of a compelling necessity.
CRIMINAL LAW-AGE OF INFANT DEFENDANT NOT GRoUND
FOR HOLDING CONFESSION INVOLUNTARY.-In 1947, the defendant,
then fourteen years old, was taken from his home at 9:30 P.M.,
and was interrogated by police officers until a formal confession
was obtained in the absence of parents or counsel. After the grand
51 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1957).52 The Court cites Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 28 U.S.
294 (1933), which considered tariff duties imposed upon foreign man-
ufacturers; Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932), which dealt with
the deportation of aliens; United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459
(1914) and Udall v. Tallnan, supra note 42, both of which were concerned
with oil and gas leases on government-owned land.
as See 73 HARv. L. REv. 1610, 1611 (1960).
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jury indictment, defendant was assigned counsel, and subsequently
entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree, for which
he was convicted. Defendant appealed from a 1963 coram nobis
proceeding in which he sought to have the guilty plea and conviction
vacated and the indictment dismissed. Affirming the denial by the
appellate division of the coram nobis petition, the New York Court
of Appeals held that the confession obtained was not coerced,
and that there was no denial of the infant's due process. People
v. De Fluner, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 209 N.E.2d 93, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42
(1965).
At common law, two presumptions operated in favor of minors
with respect to criminal liability: first, an irrebuttable presumption
that an infant under seven was incapable of committing a crime;
secondly, a rebuttable presumption that an infant between the ages
of seven and fourteen was incapable of understanding the nature
of his acts.' Despite the application of these presumptions, common-
law treatment of infants was often harsh. Consequently, certain
states, including New York, enacted statutes establishing reform-
atories in order to separate infants from hardened adult criminals.
Later, other jurisdictions provided separate hearings-and a probation
system permitting supervision instead of confinement for minors.2
The philosophy which motivated these earlier statutory enactments
has led to present legislation which, in some cases, relieves minors
of criminal responsibility and provides special procedures and new
rehabilitation techniques for juvenile offenders.3
Although an infant's capacity to confess guilt has been
recognized,4 the standards to be applied in determining whether an
infant's confession was coerced are unclear. The rule in all jur-
isdictions is that a minor's confession is not ipso facto inadmissible
as coerced, absent a statute providing otherwise.5 Age is to be
considered merely as one of many factors in determining the vol-
untariness of confessions. For example, in State v. Berberck,6
the court was faced with the problem of determining whether the
confession of an eighteen year old was voluntary. It was held
that the age, mental condition, intelligence, character, situation and
experience of the defendant are factors to be considered in de-
I RuBiN, CaR= An JuvExix DELINQuENCy 94-95 (2d ed. 1961).
2 SUSSMAN, JUVENILE DELINQUEN y 12-13 (2d ed. 1958).
3 See N.Y. FAmILY CT. AcT art 7.
4 See, e.g., Martin v. State, 90 Ala. 602, 8 So. 858 (1891) ; Carr v. State,
24 Tex. App. 562, 7 S.W. 328 (1888) ; State v. Watson, 114 Vt. 543, 49 A.2d
174 (1946).
5 De Souza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
989 (1959); Corbin v. State, 19 Ala. App. 439, 98 So. 132, cert. denied, 210
Ala. 369, 98 So. 134 (1923); Oliver v. State, 354 P.2d 792 (Okla. Crin.
1960).
838 Mont. 423, 100 Pac. 209 (1909) ; see Hawkins v. State, 6 Ga. App.
109, 64 S.E. 289 (1909).
19661
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
termining the weight to be given to the alleged confession. In
Birkenfeld v. State,7 the defendant, a sixteen year old alien who
spoke English imperfectly, had confessed to a police officer. In
affirming his conviction, the court stated that he was an intelligent
boy who was old enough to fully comprehend the situation.
Until Brown v. Mississippi,8 state courts were reluctant to place
great emphasis on the age of a defendant. In Brown, the United
States Supreme Court declared invalid a confession admitted under
circumstances which offended the requirements of due process
under the fourteenth amendment. Thereafter, the Supreme Court
established constitutional standards by which to judge the con-
fession of a minor. For example, in Haley v. Ohio,9 the defendant,
age fifteen, was arrested after midnight, and was questioned for
five hours before he confessed to a crime. He was told that he
had a right to remain silent, but was not allowed to see his parents
or an attorney before the interrogation and subsequent confession.
The Court, relying heavily upon the age of the defendant, reversed
the conviction for first degree murder, holding that the method
of eliciting the confession failed to meet the requirements of due
process. The Court stated that, in determining the voluntariness of
a minor's confession, "special care in scrutinizing the record must
be used."'10  The minor "cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens." 1 '
In many cases, the minor "needs counsel and support if he is not to
become the victim of fear, then of panic." 12 In a more recent
case, Gallegos v. Colorado,"1 the defendant, fourteen years of age,
was arrested by the police and immediately admitted the commission
of an assault and robbery. The next day, his mother requested to
see him, but permission was denied. Subsequently, a formal
confession was obtained without adult advice, and the minor was
committed to a state industrial school. Several weeks later, the
victim died, and the defendant was returned to the criminal court
where, based upon the confession, a conviction for murder was
obtained. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
holding that such factors as the youth of the defendant, the long
detention, the failure to send for his parents, to bring him before a
judge of the juvenile court, and to see that he had the advice of a
lawyer or a friend,'14 militated against finding that the confession was
voluntarily rendered.
7 104 Md. 253, 65 Ad. 1 (1906).
8 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
9 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
10 Id. at 599.
". Ibid.
1Id. at 600.
13 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
14 Id. at 55.
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Some lower courts have recently refused to reverse convictions
based on confessions of minors, finding facts distinguishable from
those in Gallegos and Haley. For example, in United States v. New
Jersey,'r two minors were detained for a period exceeding nine
hours, during which period both confessed to the crime of murder.
A conviction, based on the confessions, was affirmed on the ground
that the defendants, who were seventeen and had been involved in
previous encounters with the police, had the maturity to under-
stand the nature of their confessions.' 6 In effect, the court was
reasonably assured that the confession was voluntary. Similarly,
in Hayden v. State," a child, age fifteen, was brought to police
headquarters by his parent, and was held for one day before
a confession was obtained. Prior to his confession, he was advised
of his right to have his counsel, mother and friends present, none
of which he requested. The conviction based on the confession was
affirmed, the court holding that the confession was voluntarily made.
The Court in the instant case denied the coram nobis petition
on the ground that the confession was made under circumstances
which indicated that the child's rights were fairly protected, viz.,
that the prior confession "met all requirements of voluntari-
ness. . . ..1 Therefore, the plea of guilty to murder in the
second degree was offered as a humane disposition, since if the
indictment had come to trial a conviction of first degree murder
might well have resulted.' 9  Hence, the Court held that the age
of the child could not be the sole ground for determining whether
due process was violated.
The dissenting judges were of the opinion that, since the de-
termination of voluntariness was based on "the more exacting
standards of maturity," due process had indeed been violated.
Therefore, they reasoned, the subsequent plea of guilty should not
have been accepted by the Court.
The majority opinion can be criticized on the ground that the
standards used to determine whether the confession was involuntary
were not indicated. Instead, the Court made the nebulous statement
that "there was no denial of due process under the law then
existing." 20
'5 323 F2d 146 (3d Cir. 1963).
10 Id. at 150.
'7 199 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1964).
18 People v. De Flumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 21, 209 N.E.2d 93, 94, 261 N.Y.S.2d
42, 43 (1965).
20 At the time of the defendant's conviction, the 1948 amendment to Section
486 of the New York Penal Law, providing that children seven to fifteen
years of age could not be convicted of an act which if committed by an adult
would be a crime, had not yet been enacted. See People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d
152, 134 N.E.2d 197, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1956).
2oSupra note 18.
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Note must be taken of the fact that the lower court actually
applied the more exacting standards set forth in Gallegos and
Haley. Perhaps the instant Court feared that if it applied these
standards retroactively, and if the petitioner's confession were found
to be involuntary, it would be overwhelmed by petitions for coram
nobis for events which, in many cases, had occurred many years
in the past and had, in all probability, gone through the normal
appellate process.2 '
The New York procedure relating to the custody and detention
of minors has undergone substantial change in the last few years.
In 1962, Section 724 of the Family Court Act was enacted. The
statute, in effect, provides that when a police officer takes custody
of a minor, the officer must notify his parents or other persons
legally responsible for him. In addition, he must release the minor
to his parents upon the written promise that the child will be
brought before the Family Court. In the alternative, the police
officer may take the child directly to the Family Court, without
first taking him to a police station.22  A recent amendment provides
that if "it is necessary to question the child" the police officer may
do so for a "reasonable period of time." 23
Both Section 724 of the Family Court Act and the Supreme
Court cases of Gallegos and Haley have been used to determine
whether the confession of a minor was voluntary.24 For example,
in Matter of Rutane,25 a thirteen year old was apprehended and
questioned by police from 11 A.M. to 6 P.M., until he confessed
to a murder. The child's parents were not notified until later in
the day, and they were not allowed to see him until he had signed
the confession. The question presented was whether the confession
was involuntary. If so, the juvenile delinquency proceeding would
have to be dismissed, since the confession was the sole evidence
at the hearing. In holding the confession involuntary,, the judge
stated that the provisions of section 724 had been violated. How-
ever, this was not the sole ground for declaring the confession
invalid. The judge also relied upon Haley and Gallegos for justifying
his decision, stating that "the methods used in obtaining this 'con-
21A writ of error coram nobis, a post-conviction remedy, is commonly
brought for an alleged error of fact not appearing on the record, and is directed
to the same court in order that it may correct the error.
22N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 724, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch.
809. Other jurisdictions have similar statutes. See SUSSMAN, op. cit. mipra
note 2, at 38-44.
23N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 724(b) (ii).
24 This statute and others similar to it have been enacted to prevent the
commingling of infants and adults in the police station, and not for the
purpose of providing standards by which io judge the voluntariness of a con-
fession. This has been left for the courts in the exercise of their judicial
function. See SussMAN, op. cit. mtpra note 2, at 39-40.
2537 Misc. 2d 234, 234 N.Y.S2d 777 (Fao. Ct. 1962).
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fession' violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution," 28 and the confession, therefore, was inadmissible.
Two appellate division cases have held that violations of certain
provisions of the Family Court Act were justification for setting
aside a confession as involuntary. In the first case, Matter of
Dennis,27 defendant, age fifteen, was questioned for a period of
four days and was not permitted to see anyone for the period of a
week. He appealed from a Family Court order adjudicating him
to be a delinquent. Several sections of the Family Court Act had
been violated, including section 724. The court, setting aside the
adjudication of delinquency, considered both the violation of section
724 and the violation of the standards set forth in Gallegos. From
Dennis one could justifiably conclude that a violation of section
724, i.e., the failure to notify the parents "immediately" and to
transfer the child to a juvenile court, would not ipso facto invalidate
a minor's confession. But, in Matter of Addison-s decided on the
same day, a more liberal approach was taken by the court. Defendant,
age thirteen, was charged with being a juvenile delinquent on a
petition made by a police officer. She appeared at the police station
of her own accord, without her parents, and voluntarily confessed
to the offense. The court invalidated the confession, and indicated
by dicta "that a confession may not be obtained prior to notifying
parents or relatives and releasing the child either to them or to
a Family Court .. ," 29 The implication here is that such a
violation of section 724 could, of itself, be grounds for invalidating
the confession.
If the issue of voluntariness of a confession were presented
today, under facts similar to those in De Flumer, the Court could
determine voluntariness in either of two ways: first, it could treat
the violation of Section 724 of the Family Court Act as making
the confession ipso facto invalid, with no other consideration; or,
secondly, it could rely on the standards set forth in Gallegos and
Haley-if the confession were found to be a violation of those stand-
ards, it could be held invalid as procured through an infringement
of the defendant's constitutional rights.
In view of the policy to attempt to protect infants, as enunciated
in section 724, it is reasonable to conjecture that the courts in the
future will hold that any violation of section 724 invalidates an
infant's confession, irrespective of whether the standards set forth
in Gallegos and Haley were also violated.
20 Id. at 236-37, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
27 20 App. Div. 2d 86, 244 N.Y.S.2d 798 (4th Dep't 1963).
28 20 App. Div. 2d 90, 245 N.Y.S.2d 243 (4th Dep't 1963).
29 Id. at 92, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
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